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Agreements to Improve Student Aid:
An Antitrust Perspective
Deborah Jones Merritt and Andrew Lloyd Merritt
The cost of law school continues to climb: annual tuition and fees exceed
$60,000 at several schools.1 Tuition discounts, meanwhile, are widespread.
Just one-third of law students pay sticker price for their education; the other
two-thirds secure a discount.2 Those discounts range from a few hundred
dollars to more than $65,000.3 What accounts for such great variation in the
price that students pay for a legal education—even among students who sit in
the same classroom?
Some discounts address ﬁnancial need; others encourage students from
underrepresented minority groups to enter the legal profession. Still others
attract students with leadership abilities, multicultural awareness, military
experience, or other valued qualities. As Professor Whitford explains in a
companion article, however, a substantial number of discounts stem from
the “intense competition” fostered by the U.S. News ranking method.4 That
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1.

According to data collected by the American Bar Association Section of Legal Education
and Admissions to the Bar, seven law schools set tuition and fees that exceeded $60,000
for 2016–2017. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA
REQUIRED DISCLOSURES, http://abarequireddisclosures.org/ (last visited June 16, 2017)
(choose “Compilation—All Schools Data” for 2016, then open spreadsheet for “Tuition and
Fees and Living Expenses”) [hereinafter ABA REQUIRED DISCLOSURES].

2.

See id. (choose “Compilation—All Schools Data” for 2016, then open spreadsheet for
“Grants and Scholarships (prior academic year)”) (113,907 students were enrolled in
J.D. programs during 2015–2016, and 75,753 of them (66.5%) held a scholarship of some
amount). Throughout this article, we use the words “discount,” “grant,” and “scholarship”
interchangeably.

3.

Id. Southern Illinois University School of Law reported that twenty-ﬁve percent of its
scholarships awarded no more than $500. At the top end of the scale, Columbia Law School
reported forty-two scholarships covering its full tuition of $65,260.

4.

William C. Whitford, Law School-Administered Financial Aid: The Good News and the Bad News, 67 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 4, 4 (2017).
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method incorporates the median LSAT and UGPA of each school’s entering
class,5 giving schools a strong incentive to discount tuition in order to attract
students who will maintain or enhance those medians.6
In recent years, another incentive for discounting has emerged. Declining
student demand has forced schools to manage their budgets carefully. By
setting a high list price for tuition, and then oﬀering customized discounts,
law schools beneﬁt from price discrimination.7 This type of pricing is legal,8
but it imposes several costs on students and the educational program. Price
discrimination shifts wealth from buyers to sellers; average tuition prices
probably are higher than they would be in a more uniform pricing scheme.9
Price discrimination that focuses on merit rather than need also discourages
low-income students from fully developing their human capital.10 The opacity
of the system, ﬁnally, may deter talented students from applying to law school;
that deterrent eﬀect can be particularly severe for low-income, minority, and
female applicants.11
5.

See Robert Morse & Kenneth Hines, Methodology: 2018 Best Law Schools Rankings, U.S. NEWS:
EDUC. (Mar. 13, 2017, 9:30 PM), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/
articles/law-schools-methodology?int=9d0608 [https://perma.cc/5MWV-XB2C]. Together,
LSAT and UGPA medians account for 22.5% of a school’s score. Id.

6.

Note that when schools use discounts to advance their position in the U.S. News rankings, they
do not always reward applicants with the highest LSAT scores and UGPAs. An applicant
with a score that matches (and thus maintains) the school’s median is just as valuable as one
with a much higher score. Rankings-driven discounts thus vary from pure “merit” decisions.

7.

Economists recognize tuition discounts as a form of price discrimination. See, e.g., Matt
Gianneschi & Sarah Pingel, A Hidden Cause of Rising Tuition: Tuition Discounting in Public Colleges
and Universities, PROGRESS EDUC. REFORM (Educ. Comm’n of the States, Denver, Colo.), Aug.
2014, at 1, 4, https://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/01/14/07/11407.pdf [https://perma.cc/
UB6Z-PGJV] (“Tuition discounting is a form of price discrimination.”); Alexandre Belloni
et al., Optimal Admission and Scholarship Decisions: Choosing Customized Marketing Oﬀers to Attract a
Desirable Mix of Customers, 31 MARKETING SCI. 621, 622 (2012) (“[T]he postsecondary education
industry . . . relies heavily on price discrimination and targeted marketing under the guise
of scholarships and selective admission.”); James L. Doti, Is Higher Education Becoming
a Commodity?, 26 J. HIGHER EDUC. POL’Y & MGMT. 363, 363 (2004) (“Private colleges and
universities are price discriminators.”); Frederick G. Tiﬀany & Jeﬀ A. Ankrom, The Competitive
Use of Price Discrimination by Colleges, 24 E. ECON. J. 99 (1998); Joel Waldfogel, First Degree Price
Discrimination Goes to School, 63 J. INDUS. ECON. 569 (2015).

8.

The Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2012), outlaws some price discrimination in
selling goods, but the statute does not apply to the sale of services (including educational
programs). Nor do the statute’s tentacles reach the one-on-one haggling found on car lots
and in bazaars.

9.

See infra Part II.A (discussing both empirical and theoretical evidence of this eﬀect).

10.

See infra Part II.C. “Human capital” represents the skills, learning, and other assets that
an individual brings to the workplace. Humans invest in their capital primarily through
education. See Claudia Goldin, Human Capital, in HANDBOOK OF CLIOMETRICS 55, 56 (Claude
Diebolt & Michael Haupert eds., 2016).

11.

See infra Part II.A.
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When tuition discounts focus on need, they increase access to legal
education.12 Discounts designed to improve rankings or raise revenue, in
contrast, cause signiﬁcant harm. Like Professor Whitford, we believe that the
costs imposed by the latter discounts outweigh any beneﬁts they confer. We
encourage law schools to reduce their reliance on “merit-based” scholarships
(which encompass all discounts based on factors other than ﬁnancial need)
and devote more of their resources to need-based grants.13
Unlike Professor Whitford and other critics, however, we believe that law
schools can pursue that goal collectively—without antitrust liability. Schools,
in fact, have three avenues to seek that end. First, a little-known exemption
to the Sherman Act allows “institutions of higher education . . . to agree . . .
to award . . . ﬁnancial aid only on the basis of demonstrated ﬁnancial need”
as long as the institutions admit all students “on a need-blind basis.”14 The
same exemption allows schools “to use common principles of analysis for
determining the need of such students for ﬁnancial aid.”15 A group of law
schools could agree tomorrow to limit all of their scholarships to need-based
12.

“Need” is an amorphous concept for graduate and professional students. Many of these
students are independent of their parents; if they did not attend graduate school, they
would support themselves in the job market. At the same time, relatively few applicants have
amassed signiﬁcant savings of their own. Almost all applicants, therefore, might be able to
demonstrate some degree of need.
Law schools nonetheless recognize that ﬁnancial resources vary among their students—
and award need-based scholarships on that basis. A student from a low-income family, for
example, lacks the kind of ﬁnancial cushion available to a student from a more aﬄuent
background, even if neither set of parents pays for the student’s legal education. For
examples of how law schools currently measure need, see Determination of Financial Need, HARV.
L. SCH., http://hls.harvard.edu/dept/sfs/ﬁnancial-aid-policy-overview/determination-ofﬁnancial-need/ (last visited July 10, 2017) [https://perma.cc/D7L3-B5ER]; How Need-Based
Aid Works, YALE L. SCH., https://law.yale.edu/admissions/cost-ﬁnancial-aid/how-need-basedaid-works (last visited July 10, 2017) [https://perma.cc/UU5X-44SJ]; Financial Aid, STAN. L.
SCH., https://law.stanford.edu/apply/tuition-ﬁnancial-aid/jd-ﬁnancial-support/ (last visited
July 10, 2017) [https://perma.cc/SC5P-H7L8].

13.

As Professor Whitford reports, grants that incorporate “merit” far outnumber those based
purely on need. Whitford, supra note 4, at 7–8. In 2009-2010, public schools allocated twentyone percent of their scholarship dollars to purely need-based aid; private schools invested
ﬁfteen percent that way. TASK FORCE ON FINANCING LEGAL EDUC., AM. BAR ASS’N, FINAL
REPORT 29 (2015) [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE 2 REPORT]. More recently, a national sample
of aid recipients reported that seventy-nine percent of their awards were merit-driven. LAW
SCHOOL SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, LAW SCHOOL SCHOLARSHIP POLICIES: ENGINES
OF INEQUITY 8 (2016), http://lssse.indiana.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/LSSSE-2016Annual-Report-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/HZ8R-93P4] [hereinafter LSSSE REPORT].

14.

15 U.S.C. § 1 note (2012) (codifying Improving America’s Schools Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
103-382, title V, § 568(a), 108 Stat. 4060, as amended). This provision is scheduled to expire
on Sept. 30, 2022. The heading on the note is “Application of Antitrust Laws to Award of
Need-Based Educational Aid.” A 2015 act, called the Need-Based Educational Aid Act of
2015, Pub. L. No. 114-44, 129 Stat. 472, amends 15 U.S.C. § 1 note (2012).

15.

Id.
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aid—and could devise guidelines for measuring that need—without violating
the federal antitrust laws.16
Second, if law schools want to venture beyond this safe harbor, they could
lobby Congress to modify the current exemption. Law schools, for example,
might seek an exemption that shielded agreements to limit merit aid—without
requiring those agreements to bar merit scholarships entirely. The current
exemption already recognizes the policies supporting scholarship-related
agreements; Congress might be amenable to a slight change in the language.
Finally, if these legislative options are not suﬃcient, law schools could ask
the Department of Justice for a business review letter assessing the legality of
a proposed agreement to limit merit-based aid. The Department’s Antitrust
Division regularly issues those letters,17 and the arguments outlined in this
article would support a favorable letter. A positive letter from the department
would not immunize schools from antitrust liability, but it would signiﬁcantly
reduce any risk.
Legal education’s accrediting body, the Council of the ABA Section of Legal
Education and Admissions to the Bar, could also take steps to de-escalate the
use of merit-based aid. The council, for example, could adopt an accreditation
standard requiring each law school to divide scholarship dollars between
need- and merit-based awards.18 An alternative standard might require schools
to limit merit aid to funds drawn from endowments or donors specifying that
purpose. If those avenues appear too risky—despite the routes we outline
here—the council could adopt an accreditation standard requiring law schools
to publicize more clearly the nature and amount of tuition discounts they oﬀer
to students; that type of informational standard would incur no antitrust risk.
In Part I of this article we brieﬂy trace the history of attempts to restrict
merit-based scholarships in higher education, including the antitrust case law
and congressional exemption that now govern those attempts. In Part II we
explore social and economic research that demonstrates the procompetitive
16.

We do not address state antitrust laws in this Article. To the best of our knowledge, states
have not attempted to use those laws to prosecute agreements related to scholarships in
higher education. Cf. Memorandum from Wayne D. Collins & Vittorio E. Cottafavi to
Robert Shireman & Matthew Reed (May 5, 2008) [hereinafter Collins & Cottafavi Memo],
in INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS, TIME TO REEXAMINE INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION ON
FINANCIAL AID 12 (2008) (memo from two antitrust experts noting that states are unlikely to
challenge these restrictions because “a challenge . . . would likely be politically unpopular”).
Id. at 29.

17.

See infra Part III.C.

18.

See Letter from Deborah Jones Merritt, John Deaver Drinko/Baker & Hostetler Chair in
Law, Moritz Coll. of Law, Ohio State Univ., to the Am. Bar Ass’n Task Force on the Future
of Legal Educ. (May 11, 2013) (proposing such a standard), https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/taskforcecomments/201305_
deborah_merritt_comment.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/KR6P-QU9Z]. See also
Randall T. Shepard, The Problem of Law School Discounting—How Do We Sustain Equal Opportunity in
the Profession?, 50 IND. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2016) (discussing this proposal); Whitford, supra note 4,
at 13–14 (same).

21

Agreements to Improve Student Aid: An Antitrust Perspective

eﬀects of agreements limiting merit-based scholarships. In Part III, ﬁnally, we
explain how law schools could rely upon this history and research to navigate
the three avenues noted above. We also examine ways for the council to modify
its accreditation standards. As we show, there are several promising routes for
reforming harmful scholarship practices.
I. History: Scholarships and Antitrust Law
The tension between need-based and merit-based scholarships dates back
centuries. In 1643, Ann Radcliﬀe endowed a scholarship at the ﬂedgling
Harvard College; it was the ﬁrst scholarship in the American colonies.19 She
intended the scholarship to beneﬁt a “poor scholer,” but also expressed her
preference for a “ ‘kinsman’ if he be ‘pious’ and ‘well deserving.’ ”20 Our
nation’s ﬁrst scholarship, therefore, combined notions of need (“poor”) with
seventeenth-century concepts of merit (family relationship, piety, and moral
desert). For centuries, American colleges continued to mingle these concepts.21
After World War II, colleges felt increased pressure to provide purely needbased aid. The GI Bill had demonstrated the transformative power of higher
education, and the public wanted to maintain access to those opportunities.22
The appeal of merit-based scholarships, however, did not disappear. Top
students had begun applying to multiple schools, which stimulated bidding
wars for their enrollment.23 To end these wars and preserve resources for needy
students, some of the most selective schools agreed to award aid solely on the
basis of demonstrated ﬁnancial need. As we explain below, those agreements
provoked antitrust scrutiny and—ultimately—partial vindication.
More recently, antitrust litigation has focused on a special type of meritbased aid: athletic scholarships. The National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) has long limited the size of those scholarships, and several athletes
have challenged those restrictions. We discuss those developments, along with
their relevance for law schools, in the ﬁnal section below.
A. The Overlap Groups
Starting in the 1950s, more than 100 colleges clustered into two dozen
leagues known as “overlap groups.”24 The colleges within each group tended
19.

RUPERT WILKINSON, AIDING STUDENTS, BUYING STUDENTS: FINANCIAL AID
(2005).

20.

Id.

21.

Id. at 9-45.

22.

Id. at 115.

23.

Id. at 115-16. Even before the advent of modern ranking systems, colleges competed to attract
students with the most prestigious academic credentials. Professors like to work with highly
credentialed students; those students can also enhance the educational environment for
their classmates. Students with top credentials, ﬁnally, signal a college’s desirability to other
applicants. This phenomenon existed long before U.S. News capitalized on it.

24.

TIME TO REEXAMINE, supra note 16, at 6.

IN
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to receive applications from common students; the word “overlap” referred to
their overlapping applicant pools. Within several of these groups, the members
agreed to ban merit-based scholarships and award only need-based aid. The
groups also developed common guidelines for assessing need; this prevented
participating colleges from awarding merit-based scholarships in the guise
of extra need. Within at least some groups, ﬁnally, admissions oﬃcers met
annually to discuss the ﬁnancial need of each student admitted to more than
one of the group’s colleges. For each of those “overlapping” admittees, the
schools agreed on the student’s level of need.25
The most prominent overlap group was the “Ivy Overlap” one, composed
of the eight Ivy League colleges and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT).26 Those schools, like members of some other groups,
agreed to award scholarships solely on the basis of ﬁnancial need assessed by
common guidelines. Starting in 1958, representatives of the Ivy Group met
regularly to compare need assessments for students admitted to two or more
of their schools. When schools diﬀered by more than $500 in that assessment
for a student, they adjusted their calculations so that students would pay
comparable amounts to attend any school within the group.27
These meetings continued for more than thirty years. In 1989, The Washington
Post revealed the practice and denounced the schools for maintaining a “priceﬁxing system that OPEC might envy.”28 The article prompted the Department
of Justice to investigate all of the overlap groups for possible antitrust
violations.29 In 1991, it decided to pursue the Ivy Overlap Group in court. The
department ﬁled a civil action against all nine members of that group, alleging
that they were violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act.30 The eight Ivy League
schools signed a consent decree in which they denied liability but agreed to
end the challenged agreements.31 MIT, however, decided to defend the group’s
practices in court.
B. The Lawsuit
The trial contest between MIT and the Department of Justice unfolded
in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. After a tenday trial, Chief Judge Louis C. Bechtle ruled for the Department of Justice
(Brown I).32 The Ivy Overlap agreement, Judge Bechtle found, “struck at the
25.

Id. at 6–7; WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 131–32.

26.

WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 132; TIME TO REEXAMINE, supra note 16, at 7.

27.

See United States v. Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. 288, 292-96 (E.D. Pa. 1992) [hereinafter Brown
I], rev’d, 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).

28.

WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 196.

29.

Brown I, 805 F. Supp. at 289.

30.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).

31.

Collins & Cottafavi Memo, supra note 16, at 24–25.

32.

Brown I, 805 F. Supp. 288.
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heart of the commercial relationship” between colleges and their students.33 By
setting aid amounts and banning merit scholarships, he decided, the colleges
engaged in horizontal price ﬁxing.34 He refrained from declaring that conduct
per se illegal “in light of the Supreme Court’s repeated counsel against
presumptive invalidation of restraints involving professional associations,”
but found the conduct unlawful after applying an abbreviated rule of reason
analysis.35 The Ivy Group failed that “quick look” test because its justiﬁcations
rested on “social policy aims” rather than the procompetitive goals required
by the antitrust laws.36
MIT appealed the decision and, in September 1993, the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit decisively reversed the district court (Brown II).37 One
member of the panel concluded that the award of university scholarships
was “charity” rather than commercial activity; he would have granted
judgment immediately for MIT.38 Indeed, he “question[ed] why the heavy
artillery of antitrust has been wheeled into position to shoot down practices
that so obviously advance the public interest.”39 The other two judges, who
conveyed the majority view, also displayed considerable sympathy for MIT’s
position. They decided that MIT had articulated at least two procompetitive
justiﬁcations for the Overlap agreement, which required the district court to
apply a “full scale rule of reason analysis.”40
The ﬁrst of these justiﬁcations stemmed from MIT’s claim that the agreement
“enhanced the consumer appeal of an Overlap education” by “promoting
socio-economic diversity at member institutions.”41 The Third Circuit agreed
33.

Id. at 298.

34.

Id. at 301.

35.

Id. at 301. The courts have developed three types of review for practices challenged as
unlawful restraints of trade. Some agreements are per se illegal, others are evaluated under
a rule of reason, and an intermediate group receives an abbreviated or “quick look” rule-ofreason analysis. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED
HANDBOOK § 5.1a (3d ed. 2016); Collins & Cottafavi Memo, supra note 16, at 15–16 (discussing
the three standards of review in the context of the Brown litigation).

36.

Brown I, 805 F. Supp. at 305. The Supreme Court has made clear that antitrust law “focuses
directly on [a] challenged restraint’s impact on competitive conditions.” Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l
Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978). Litigants cannot invoke social welfare
concerns to justify a restraint on trade; the courts accept only procompetitive justiﬁcations.
See generally SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 35, § 5.3f.

37.

United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Brown II].

38.

Id. at 683 (Weis, J., dissenting).

39.

Id. at 680. Judge Weis’s position almost certainly conﬂicts with established antitrust
principles, which direct courts to focus exclusively on a restraint’s competitive impact.
Broader appeals to the “public interest” cannot justify a trade restraint. See supra note 36.
Weis’s opinion, however, reﬂects the sympathetic eye that judges can bring to agreements
designed to further educational aims.

40.

Id. at 679.

41.

Id.
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that “improvement in the quality of a product or service that enhances the
public’s desire for that product or service” may count as a “procompetitive
virtue.”42 The second procompetitive eﬀect rested on the fact that “the number
of students able to aﬀord an Overlap education [was] maximized.”43 By
“removing ﬁnancial obstacles for the greatest number of talented but needy
students” and “widening student choice,” the Ivy Overlap agreement increased
the number of students eligible for an elite college education.44 Once again,
the court acknowledged “consumer choice [as] a traditional objective of the
antitrust laws” that confers a “procompetitive beneﬁt.”45
The appellate court noted several other points that favored MIT. The
Ivy Overlap agreement, the court observed, did not “cause any reduction
of output.”46 The participating colleges, in other words, educated as many
students under the agreement as they would have done in its absence. Nor
did the agreement appear to have “an aggregate eﬀect on the price of an MIT
education.”47 The agreement shifted costs among students, but did not allow
MIT to reap higher revenue overall. This “absence of any ﬁnding of adverse
eﬀects such as higher price or lower output [was] relevant” to the agreement’s
status under the rule of reason.48 The court remanded the case for the trial
judge to more fully assess the agreement under that rule.
That assessment, the court noted, would include consideration of any
“substantially less restrictive alternative” to the Ivy Overlap agreement.49 The
rule of reason, it reminded the district court, requires a multistep inquiry. First
the plaintiﬀ must show that an “agreement produced adverse, anti-competitive
eﬀects within the relevant product and geographic markets.”50 Next, the
defendant may “show that the challenged conduct promotes a suﬃciently
pro-competitive objective.”51 If the defendant carries that burden, then “the
plaintiﬀ must demonstrate that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to
achieve the stated objective.”52 On remand, therefore, the court would consider
both the procompetitive objectives urged by MIT and the availability of any
less restrictive means identiﬁed by the Department of Justice.
42.

Id. (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 114-15 (1984)).

43.

Id. at 675.

44.

Id.

45.

Id. (citing NCAA, 468 U.S. at 102).

46.

Id. at 674.

47.

Id.

48.

Id.

49.

Id. at 679.

50.

Id. at 668.

51.

Id. at 669.

52.

Id.
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The department, however, opted to end the case. Rather than petition the
Supreme Court for certiorari or return to the district court, the government
dismissed the lawsuit in return for a letter in which MIT agreed to abide
by designated “Standards of Conduct.”53 Those standards allowed MIT
and other schools to “agree to provide only need-based ﬁnancial aid and to
prohibit merit scholarships” as long as the participating schools “practice[d]
need-blind admissions” and “provide[d] ﬁnancial aid suﬃcient to meet the full
need of all [admitted] students.”54 The department, therefore, acquiesced in
group agreements to limit merit aid; its only victory lay in preventing colleges
from jointly setting ﬁnancial need for speciﬁc students.
The department’s willingness to dismiss the suit in return for a letter,
rather than require a consent decree or settlement contract, was unusual.55
The department’s leniency may have reﬂected the force of the Third Circuit’s
support for agreements banning merit-based scholarships. Equally important,
congressional developments had reduced the lawsuit’s importance.
C. Congressional Action
While MIT fought for the Overlap principles in court, its Ivy League peers
successfully lobbied Congress.56 The 1992 amendments to the Higher Education
Act allowed institutions of higher education to “voluntarily agree . . . to award
ﬁnancial aid . . . only on the basis of demonstrated ﬁnancial need” and to
“discuss and voluntarily adopt deﬁned principles of professional judgment for
determining student ﬁnancial need.”57 To eliminate any prospect of antitrust
liability, the section explicitly declared: “No inference of unlawful contract,
combination, or conspiracy shall be drawn from the fact that institutions of
higher education engage in conduct authorized by this section.”58
Congress, notably, set this exemption to expire after just two years.59 It
also provided that the temporary exemption would not “aﬀect any antitrust
litigation pending on the date of enactment.” 60 The legislators, in other words,
gave the Department of Justice an opportunity to seek judicial validation
of its underlying antitrust claims. In particular, the department could have
petitioned the Supreme Court to review the Third Circuit’s decision. Instead,
53.

Letter from MIT Lawyer Thane D. Scott to Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. Robert
Litan (Dec. 22, 1993), http://tech.mit.edu/Bulletins/ovrlp-ts.html [https://perma.cc/
PJG3-7BBT].

54.

Id.

55.

See Collins & Cottafavi Memo, supra note 16, at 26.

56.

See generally WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 199–200.

57.

Pub. L. No. 102-325, 106 Stat. 456, section 1544(b). This provision did not limit the exemption
to schools practicing need-blind admissions. Congress added that caveat in 1994. See infra
note 61.

58.

Id. section 1544(d).

59.

Id. section 1544(e).

60.

Id. section 1544(a).
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the department allowed MIT to sign a letter similar to the statutory exemption.
The department thus joined the Third Circuit and Congress in allowing
agreements that barred merit-based scholarships.
Congress did not allow the statutory exemption to lapse. It renewed the
provision in 1994,61 and has continued to renew it since then.62 The most recent
extension, passed in 2015, prolongs the antitrust exemption to September
30, 2022.63 Institutions of higher education, therefore, may agree to award
scholarships “only on the basis of demonstrated ﬁnancial need” and “to use
common principles of analysis for determining the need” as long as they
engage in “need-blind” admissions.64
D. Use of the Congressional Exemption
Surprisingly few colleges or universities have taken advantage of Congress’s
“overlap” exemption.65 On the contrary, a majority of undergraduate
institutions embraced merit-based aid during the 1990s and 2000s.66 Some
schools used that aid to balance budgets and ﬁll empty seats.67 Others
succumbed to pressures generated by newly popular ranking systems. Meritbased aid, these schools discovered, would attract students with higher test
scores and high school grades; those credentials, in turn, would enhance the
school’s rank.68
Just as the Ivy Overlap group prevailed, therefore, commitment to needbased aid waned among colleges.69 Even elite schools backed away from
agreements to bar all merit-based scholarships. A few dozen formed an
association known as the “568 Presidents’ Group,” named after the statutory
61.

Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 568, 108 Stat. 3518, 4060.
This version was the ﬁrst to limit the exemption’s reach to schools practicing need-blind
admissions. Id. § 568(a). The statute, however, did not require schools to meet the ﬁnancial
need of all admitted students, as MIT’s letter agreement with the Department of Justice
provided. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.

62.

For a brief discussion of this history, see Collins & Cottafavi Memo, supra note 16, at 27.

63.

Need-Based Educational Aid Act of 2105, Pub. L. No. 114-44, 129 Stat. 472 (2015).

64.

15 U.S.C. § 1 note (2012).

65.

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-963, HIGHER EDUCATION: SCHOOLS’ USE OF
THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION HAS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED COLLEGE AFFORDABILITY
OR LIKELIHOOD OF STUDENT ENROLLMENT TO DATE 9–10 (2006), http://www.gao.gov/
assets/260/251608.pdf [https://perma.cc/J84W-TWS8] [hereinafter GAO REPORT].

66.

WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 152–53; Amanda L. Griﬃth, Keeping Up with the Joneses: Institutional
Changes Following the Adoption of a Merit Aid Policy, 30 ECON. EDUC. REV. 1022, 1022–23, 1025 (2011).

67.

WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 164–74.

68.

Griﬃth, supra note 66, at 1023–24.

69.

We have not found any evidence that law schools (or other graduate programs) ever
considered using the overlap exemption. Graduate and professional programs did not
participate in the original overlap groups or the antitrust litigation. The exemption appears
to have gone unnoticed among post-baccalaureate programs.
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section creating the antitrust exemption.70 The group, however, has limited its
work to maintaining common guidelines for its members to use when assessing
ﬁnancial need.71 It does not require its members to eschew all merit-based aid;
nor has it pursued other options allowed by the statutory exemption.72
Some educators and policymakers have urged colleges to make more use of
the exemption. In 2008, for example, The Institute for College Access & Success
called for colleges to increase enrollment of low-income students by shifting
aid from merit-based scholarships to need-based ones.73 Colleges, the institute
noted, could avoid the problems of unilateral action by joining agreements
shielded by the exemption.74 Similarly, a group of college presidents discussed
both the exemption and their desire to constrain merit aid at a 2013 meeting
sponsored by the Council of Independent Colleges (CIC).75 Educators have
also mooted the idea of expanding the current exemption to allow agreements
to limit aid, rather than ban that aid entirely.76
The Antitrust Division has given mixed signals about its attitude toward
overlap-like agreements. In 2013, the president of one higher education
association reported that he had held “a series of preliminary conversations
in which oﬃcials of the U.S. Justice Department had expressed a willingness
to review (and potentially bless) accords in which colleges would agree to
take common steps to reduce non-need-based aid.”77 Later the same year,
however, the department opened an informal investigation into the CIC
meeting at which college presidents had discussed their desire to limit merit70.

GAO REPORT, supra note 65, at 9–10.

71.

Id. at 11.

72.

Id. The group maintains a website, http://www.568group.org/index.html, although the
site has not been updated since 2016. A few of the wealthiest colleges, including Harvard
and Yale, now award more need-based aid than the 568 guidelines allow. These colleges,
accordingly, no longer participate in the group. See Caitlin Roman, Yale Leaves Financial Aid
Group, YALE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 26, 2008, http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2008/09/26/
university-leaves-ﬁnancial-aid-group/ [https://perma.cc/L9VL-G639].

73.

TIME TO REEXAMINE, supra note 16, at 6.

74.

Id. at 7–11.

75.

Doug Lederman, Baby Steps for Need-Based Aid, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 7, 2013), https://www.
insidehighered.com/news/2013/01/07/private-college-presidents-push-campaign-limit-usenon-need-based-aid [https://perma.cc/2263-8GV5]. See also WILKINSON, supra note 19, at
142–74 (reporting administrators’ desire to shift resources from merit scholarships to needbased aid); Scott Jaschik, Angst and Hope for Liberal Arts Colleges, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 13,
2016),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/07/13/meeting-discusses-challengesfacing-liberal-arts-colleges [https://perma.cc/TN4T-HFLV] (reporting academic conference
discussing these issues).

76.

TIME TO REEXAMINE, supra note16, at 10–11; WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 191–92; Lederman,
supra note 75.

77.

Lederman, supra note 75.
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based scholarships.78 The department quickly backed oﬀ the investigation,79
especially after the presidents noted their First Amendment right to discuss
proposed legislation,80 but the incident made some academic oﬃcials uneasy
about discussing problems in the ﬁnancial aid system.
E. Student-Athletes and the NCAA
At the college level, athletic scholarships constitute an important set of merit
awards. The NCAA allows schools to award scholarships based on athletic
ability but, in order to preserve the amateur nature of college athletics, limits
those scholarships to the “cost of attendance” at college.81 Schools, in other
words, may not oﬀer athletes ﬁnancial payments that exceed their educational
costs. Until 2014, the scholarship cap was somewhat lower, embracing only
“tuition and fees, room and board, and required course-related books.”82 That
lower cap precluded schools from paying for transportation, supplies, and
some other incidental expenses of college attendance.83
Several athletes have challenged the scholarship caps under the antitrust
laws. A recent decision by the Ninth Circuit, O’Bannon v. NCAA, gave both sides
a partial victory. Reviewing the NCAA’s pre-2014 rule, the court agreed with
the athletes that the scholarship cap had a “signiﬁcant anticompetitive eﬀect
on the college education market.”84 The court then sided with the NCAA on
the existence of a procompetitive justiﬁcation: the scholarship limit furthered
the NCAA’s commitment to amateurism, which enhanced the leagues’ “appeal
to consumers.”85 In the ﬁnal step of its analysis, however, the court concluded
that the NCAA had not used the least restrictive means to protect amateurism;
on the contrary, there were “reasonable alternatives” that would be “virtually
as eﬀective” as the NCAA’s challenged rule “without [imposing] signiﬁcantly
increased cost.”86 The best alternative was the one that the NCAA had already
adopted: raising the scholarship cap to cover the full cost of college attendance.
78.

Kevin Kiley, A Deficit of Trust, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 18, 2013), https://www.
insidehighered.com/news/2013/06/18/justice-department-launches-investigation-merit-aidtalks [https://perma.cc/M9HL-SZ5G].

79.

David McCabe, Nugent Avoids DOJ Investigation into Aid, KENYON COLLEGIAN (Gambier, Ohio),
Sept. 5, 2013, at 4, https://issuu.com/kenyoncollegian/docs/kenyon_collegian_09.05.13/4
[https://perma.cc/26LA-GYPX].

80.

E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).

81.

O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1054–55 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016).

82.

Id. at 1054.

83.

The monetary diﬀerence amounted to “a few thousand dollars at most schools.” Id. at 1054
n.3.

84.

Id. at 1072.

85.

Id. at 1073.

86.

Id. at 1074.
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Although the NCAA lost the O’Bannon contest, the Ninth Circuit’s decision
established a key principle favoring the organization. The court enthusiastically
endorsed the “NCAA’s commitment to amateurism” and the weight of that
commitment in a rule-of-reason scale.87 The NCAA lost because it had already
created a less restrictive rule that promoted the same ends; the court simply
required it to apply that rule retroactively. The court’s overall approach bodes
well for schools defending other types of agreements to limit scholarships. If
schools articulate a persuasive procompetitive purpose, and there are no less
restrictive means to attain that purpose, courts may uphold the agreements.88
Litigation over the NCAA’s scholarship rules continues. The organization
is settling one class action on grounds that track O’Bannon; it has agreed to
compensate class members for the money they lost under the NCAA’s pre-2014
scholarship rules.89 A more ambitious class action remains on the docket: That
one challenges all restrictions on athletic scholarships, claiming that schools
should be able to bid openly for the market value of players.90 Resolution of
that lawsuit could aﬀect the legality of other agreements to limit merit-based
scholarships. The sports context, however, is so distinctive that it oﬀers only
limited guidance to law schools contemplating restrictions on other types of
merit aid.
87.

Id. at 1073. Michael Carrier argues that the O’Bannon court “short-circuited” its rule-of-reason
analysis by failing to conduct a full balancing test. Michael A. Carrier, How Not to Apply
the Rule of Reason: The O’Bannon Case, 114 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 73, 73 (2015),
http://michiganlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/114MichLRevFI73_Carrier.
pdf [https://perma.cc/TJW8-3CBY]. We read the O’Bannon opinion, however, as implicitly
ﬁnding that the procompetitive eﬀects of amateurism outweigh the anticompetitive eﬀects
on athletes, rather than as resting solely on analysis of least restrictive means.

88.

See also Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012) (dismissing challenge to NCAA
scholarship caps on the ground that the plaintiﬀs failed to properly identify a relevant
market); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988) (NCAA rules limiting beneﬁts
awarded student-athletes are valid under the rule of reason).
Antitrust defendants, of course, should do more than simply articulate a procompetitive
eﬀect; they should oﬀer some credible evidence that the eﬀect exists. Stephen F. Ross and
Wayne DeSarbo persuasively critique O’Bannon on the ground that the defendants failed to
show that payments to student-athletes actually would diminish the consumer appeal of
college sports. Stephen F. Ross & Wayne S. DeSarbo, A Rapid Reaction to O’Bannon: The Need
for Analytics in Applying the Sherman Act to Overly Restrictive Joint Venture Schemes, 119 PENN ST. L. REV.
STATIM 43 (2015), https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/ﬁles/OBannon%20Final_0.
pdf [https://perma.cc/H6JY-EXUG]. They also oﬀer an innovative marketing technique to
measure any such eﬀect.

89.

Ralph D. Russo, Preliminary Approval Given to $208.7 Million NCAA Settlement, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 22,
2017, 1:53 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/california/articles/2017-03-22/
preliminary-approval-given-to-2087-million-ncaa-settlement [https://perma.cc/TYW5KCM5]. The district judge gave preliminary approval to the settlement in March, and the
plaintiﬀs’ ﬁrm has started notifying class members about the settlement. See NCAA Grant-InAid Settlement, http://www.grantinaidsettlement.com/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2017).

90.

Michael McCann, How Tentative Grant-in-Aid Class Action Settlement Aﬀects NCAA, Student-Athletes,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.si.com/college-football/2017/02/04/
shawne-alston-grant-aid-class-action-lawsuit-ncaa-settlement (discussing Jenkins v. NCAA,
ﬁled in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey).
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II. Promoting Competition
The precedents discussed above show signiﬁcant sympathy for agreements
restricting scholarships in higher education. The case law is limited, but courts
have judged those agreements under the rule of reason rather than declare them
invalid per se. The cases also make clear that an anti-competitive agreement
will survive scrutiny if the defendant articulates procompetitive rationales for
the compact, the plaintiﬀ cannot point to a less restrictive alternative, and
the procompetitive beneﬁts outweigh any anti-competitive burden.91 The
procompetitive rationales voiced by the defendant play a key role in that
analysis: They determine whether less restrictive alternatives are feasible, as
well as whether the rule-of-reason balance tilts in the agreement’s favor.
With that template in mind, we explore the procompetitive rationales that
might justify an agreement to limit merit scholarships in legal education. As
we show, those scholarships harm the market in at least three ways: They raise
overall prices; reduce access and diversity; and diminish investment in human
capital. Agreements restricting those scholarships, conversely, would moderate
prices, enhance access and diversity, and encourage students to invest more
fully in their human capital. Each of these justiﬁcations is a procompetitive
one that would justify an agreement to limit merit scholarships.
We cast our arguments in procompetitive terms, rather than social welfare
ones, because the antitrust laws recognize only the former justiﬁcations.92
Through the Sherman Act, Congress established a “national policy favoring
competition.”93 Courts cannot deviate from that policy by deciding that, in
certain markets, another public value trumps competition. Instead, in antitrust
litigation, “the inquiry is conﬁned to a consideration of impact on competitive
conditions.”94 We focus our inquiry on the same issue.
A. Increased Costs
The report of a recent ABA task force suggests that widespread tuition
discounting “contributes to the steadily increasing price of legal education.”95
91.

See generally Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV.
1265 (explaining how courts apply these considerations).

92.

See supra note 36.

93.

FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 234 (2013).

94.

Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978). Some agreements
promote procompetitive ends along with social welfare goals. Indeed, parties often can
articulate the same purpose in multiple ways. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 35, § 5.3f. Courts
do not penalize parties for pursuing social policies other than competition (unless those
policies mask an attempt to restrict competition), but they accept only procompetitive
purposes to defend an agreement.

95.

TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC., AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
2 (2014),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_
responsibility/report_and_recommendations_of_aba_task_force.authcheckdam.
pdf [https://perma.cc/HQ9J-DUFW]. See also Frank H. Wu, Foreword, LSSSE REPORT, supra
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The task force, in other words, proposed that discounting allows law schools
to collect more revenue from students overall than they would obtain through
uniform pricing. Economic theory and empirical research support that
suggestion.
By setting a steep nominal tuition and then oﬀering individual discounts, law
schools are able to beneﬁt from price discrimination.96 Each school estimates
the maximum price that an applicant will pay to attend that school—and then
tries to match that price with an appropriate discount.97 When calculating
those oﬀers, schools have a signiﬁcant degree of consumer information. They
know each applicant’s credentials, which allows them to predict the other
schools that might have admitted the applicant and how much aid those
schools might oﬀer.98 Indeed, some information about competing oﬀers and
scholarship awards is publicly available on the website lawschoolnumbers.
com.99 Some schools also request detailed ﬁnancial data from applicants,
including information about parental income.100 This information allows
note 13, at 5 (“Law schools could reduce the price of attendance across-the-board for the
beneﬁt of students” by abandoning merit-based scholarships.).
96.

See supra note 7 (citing economic literature that recognizes higher education scholarships as a
form of price discrimination).

97.

Schools, of course, also follow their own preferences in making scholarship oﬀers. A
candidate with an LSAT at the school’s median might be willing to attend that school for
free, but the school is unlikely to lower its price that far for a median student.

98.

Some of those predictions rest on experience; others depend on sophisticated algorithms.
See Belloni et al., supra note 7, at 623–31 (describing an algorithm for graduate MBA
programs); Matthew Quirk, The Best Class Money Can Buy, ATLANTIC, Nov. 2005 (describing
both experiential and mathematical models) https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2005/11/the-best-class-money-can-buy/304307/ [https://perma.cc/P8DN-ZRL6];
Jeﬀrey A. Summers, Net Tuition Revenue Generation at Private Liberal Arts Colleges, 12 EDUC. ECON.
219, 227–28 (2014).

99.

Prospective law students founded this site as a way of sharing information about the
application process. About Us, LAW SCHOOL NUMBERS, http://lawschoolnumbers.com/about
(last visited July 9, 2017). Applicants post their academic credentials, schools to which they
have applied, admission status at those schools, and the size of any scholarship awards.
Participation may skew toward applicants with large scholarship oﬀers, and there is no
guarantee that applicants report their status accurately, but the data provide admissions
oﬃcers (and any other interested person) an overview of admission standards and pending
scholarship oﬀers at competing schools.

100. Duke Law School, for example, counsels applicants: “Except for those students who have
signiﬁcant personal and/or family resources, all candidates are urged to complete [a ﬁnancial
disclosure proﬁle] so that they can be considered for the full range of available need- and
merit-based scholarships.” Applying for Scholarships, DUKE LAW, https://law.duke.edu/admis/
ﬁnancial/handbook/sec2/#a [https://perma.cc/E56K-ZXNB]. “Parental information is
required” for that proﬁle “regardless of age or marital status.” Applying for Financial Aid, DUKE
LAW, https://law.duke.edu/admis/ﬁnancial/handbook/sec1/ [https://perma.cc/4YCTLC5T]. See also Gregory Randolph, Price Discrimination and Rising Costs: Is There Any Relationship?,
in DOING MORE WITH LESS: MAKING COLLEGES WORK BETTER 53, 60–62 (Joshua C. Hall ed.,
2010) (reviewing ﬁnancial information available to colleges when admitting students and
calculating scholarships).
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schools to tailor individualized discount oﬀers for each student. If the initial
discount misses the mark, the school may be able to negotiate directly with an
applicant.101
In addition to possessing this information, each law school holds signiﬁcant
market power over some of its applicants. Students do not have the option
of purchasing a legal education from any law school; they are limited to the
schools that oﬀer them admission. As students choose among that subset of
schools, they usually prefer one school over others.102 For each student, the
preferred school holds considerable market power: Other schools are weak
substitutes, and the student will pay more to attend the preferred school.
In economic terms, each student’s demand for his/her preferred school is
relatively inelastic; that inelasticity confers market power.103
Law schools, of course, vary in the extent of market power they exercise.
Some schools have rivals that match them closely in student appeal; those
schools may compete aggressively to attract students out of a common
applicant pool. Other schools hold a more commanding position based on
their geographic location, reputation, employment outcomes, or other factors.
Every law school, however, holds market power over at least some applicants—
and the aggregate power is substantial.104
This combination of market power and consumer information gives law
schools the ability to customize prices for admitted students. That price
discrimination is lawful; indeed, it is an increasingly common practice in the
101. Scholarship negotiations have become common in recent years. Although applicants, rather
than schools, typically initiate these negotiations, schools often have the opportunity to
increase oﬀers for desirable students.
Prospective students possess some of the same information available to law schools;
those insights can strengthen their hand in negotiations. Applicants, however, vary widely
in their knowledge of the scholarship market. Even well-informed negotiators, moreover,
cannot forestall price discrimination. The essence of price discrimination is that sellers
customize prices to extract the maximum price that each applicant is willing to pay.
Negotiation is simply one means of achieving that end.
102. That preference often rests on the school’s prestige or employment outcomes, which aﬀect
the market value of the degree. Geography also plays an important role for some applicants.
Cf. Jerome M. Organ, Net Tuition Trends by LSAT Category from 2010-2014 with Thoughts on Variable
Return on Investment, 67 J. LEGAL EDUC. 51, 52–54 (2017) (describing geographic diﬀerences in
cost of law school). A range of other preferences can also sway an applicant’s decision.
103. A group of economists recently demonstrated a similar pattern of market power among
colleges. See Dennis Epple et al., Market Power and Price Discrimination in the U.S. Market
for Higher Education 27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res, Working Paper, No. 23360, 2017) (all
colleges are able to obtain tuition revenue that exceeds marginal eﬀective cost and “the
most selective colleges have signiﬁcant market power and charge signiﬁcant mark-ups to
students”), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23360.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6WD-ASUV].
104. Remember that market power does not guarantee a sale; consumer demand rarely is
perfectly inelastic. By oﬀering a substantial scholarship, a second-choice school may lure an
applicant away from his/her ﬁrst choice. The very size of the scholarships needed to achieve
that goal, however, conﬁrms the market power that the ﬁrst-choice school wields.
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marketplace.105 Economists agree, however, that price discrimination almost
always “transfer[s] wealth away from consumers and toward sellers.”106 This
happens because the seller can extract each buyer’s “reserve price,” the highest
price at which the buyer is willing to purchase the service. The buyers who
pay top dollar more than compensate for the ones who pay lower prices; on
average, consumers pay more than they would in a uniform pricing scheme.
Price discrimination has two diﬀerent eﬀects, which are important to
separate. First, some consumers subsidize others. In legal education, as many
educators have recognized, the students who pay list-price tuition subsidize
those who receive scholarships. But second, and equally important, the average
price rises for consumers. This second eﬀect is not merely theoretical; several
researchers have demonstrated its presence empirically in higher education.107
One study calculated that a graduate program could raise net revenue by at
least four percent to ﬁve percent through price discrimination; larger gains of
eight percent to nine percent would have been possible absent a statutory cap
on tuition.108
This eﬀect on overall price provides a procompetitive justiﬁcation for
agreements to limit merit scholarships: By restricting price discrimination,
those agreements would reduce tuition prices overall. Law school tuition is
suﬃciently high that even a marginal decrease would beneﬁt students.109 A
105. See supra note 8 (noting the legality of price discrimination in service industries). For a
discussion of increasing price discrimination in the marketplace, see Lina M. Khan, Note,
Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 763 (2017) (discussing how retailers are anxious to
use detailed consumer information to diﬀerentiate prices).
106. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE § 14.5a, at 772 (5th ed. 2016). See also Nicholas W. Hillman, Tuition Discounting for
Revenue Management, 53 RES. IN HIGHER EDUC. 263, 268 (2012) (“colleges can intentionally
exploit students’ willingness to pay in order to extract their consumer surplus”); Waldfogel,
supra note 7, at 570 (“[P]rice discrimination can allow sellers to generate more revenue.”).
107. See, e.g., Doti, supra note 7, at 365–66 (study of 107 colleges and universities suggested positive
revenue eﬀects of price discrimination, although gains appeared to diminish for less selective
schools); Hillman, supra note 106 (study of public colleges demonstrated revenue-enhancing
eﬀect of price discrimination); Summers, supra note 98 (study of more than 100 private liberal
arts colleges found that price discrimination increased revenue); Tiﬀany & Ankrom, supra
note 7 (data from a sample of 233 colleges suggested that schools had increased net revenue
through price discrimination). See generally Jerry Sheehan Davis, Unintended Consequences of
Tuition Discounting, LUMINA FOUND. FOR EDUC. NEW AGENDA SERIES (Indianapolis, IN), May
2003, at 4, https://www.luminafoundation.org/ﬁles/publications/Tuitiondiscounting.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MA2R-X9JB] (Tuition discounting “is the art and science of establishing
the net price of attendance for students at amounts that will maximize tuition revenue while
achieving certain enrollment goals.”); Dennis Epple et al., Admission, Tuition, and Financial
Aid Policies in the Market for Higher Education, 74 ECONOMETRICA 885, 887 (2006) (by “link[ing]
tuition to student (household) income,” colleges “extract additional revenues from students
who are inframarginal consumers of [that] college”).
108. Waldfogel, supra note 7, at 595.
109. Suppose, for example, that a school’s average net tuition (with a high sticker price and
discounting) is $25,000. If price discrimination generates a four percent premium,
then eliminating discounts would lower tuition by an average of $1,000 per student for
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price decline might also attract additional students to law school; most schools
currently operate at signiﬁcantly less than full capacity.110
Schools, of course, might choose to maintain at least some price
discrimination. A school, for example, might conclude that students with high
LSAT scores add enough dynamism to the classroom that students with lower
scores should subsidize the former students. Schools might also diﬀerentiate
tuition so that students with corporate aspirations subsidize those committed
to public service. No law prevents schools from making those choices. But if
schools want to restrict merit-based scholarships, as many writers (including
us) propose, the price-enhancing eﬀects of those scholarships would help
justify an agreement to limit them.
Need-based scholarships deserve special mention. Like merit-based
scholarships, those discounts reﬂect price discrimination. Students from
wealthy backgrounds subsidize the tuition of classmates from low-income
families; average prices may also rise. Three factors, however, make need-based
scholarships more procompetitive than merit-based ones. First, law schools are
unlikely to grant as many need-based awards as merit-driven ones.111 Any eﬀect
on overall prices, therefore, will be smaller than in the current system. Second,
need-based scholarships will increase access to law school, which promotes
consumer welfare.112 Need-based scholarships, ﬁnally, serve the procompetitive
each year of enrollment. That $3,000 is equivalent to 2.5 weeks of pay at an entry-level
law job. See Salaries for New Graduates Rise While Employment Rate Remains Unchanged, Number
of Private Practice Jobs Tumbles, NALP (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.nalp.org/uploads/
SelectedFindingsPressRelease_Classof2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/YN3M-G7CC] (median
starting salary for 2015 graduates was $64,800).
110. Enrollment of ﬁrst-year J.D. students has fallen 29.3% over the past six years. Compare
Enrollment and Degrees Awarded 1963-2012 Academic Years, AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC.
& ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.
authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/N95G-2DHT] (52,488 ﬁrst-year J.D. students in
2010-2011), with 2016 Standard 509 Information Report Data Overview, AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION
OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/2016_
standard_509_data_overview.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/9S2T-XET2] (37,107
ﬁrst-year J.D. students in 2016–2017).
111.

In our current merit-focused system, two-thirds of all law students hold scholarships. See
supra note 2. In contrast, about ﬁve percent of students come from families in the bottom
quartile of the income distribution; another eleven percent hail from families in the next
quartile. Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENVER U.L. REV. 631, 639
(2011). Even if need-based scholarships greatly increased attendance by those students, as we
hope, the percentage attending will fall far short of two-thirds.

112. See infra Part II.B. Our current system of merit-based scholarships may attract some students
who would otherwise have attended other graduate programs. There is little evidence,
however, that this has occurred to any signiﬁcant extent. Applications to law school remain
low, and schools are turning to other initiatives to attract those students. Allowing law school
applicants to use scores from the general Graduate Record Exam (GRE), for example, may
have a greater eﬀect in attracting students from other degree programs.
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goal of encouraging low-income students to expand their human capital.113 For
all of these reasons, need-based scholarships have procompetitive eﬀects that
merit-based awards lack.
B. Reduced Access and Diversity
In addition to raising overall costs, merit-based scholarships can
signiﬁcantly reduce both access to higher education and diversity on campus.
Those negative eﬀects arise in at least four ways. First, if schools draw all
scholarships from the same ﬁnancial bucket, increases in merit aid reduce the
resources available for low-income students.114 This trade-oﬀ is not inevitable;
schools could fund need-based scholarships by taking money from other parts
of the budget. As a practical matter, however, dollars for merit-based aid tend
to diminish dollars for need-based scholarships.115
Second, merit-based scholarships have driven up the list price of tuition.
Those posted rates deter some applicants more than others: They cause more
“sticker shock” among low-income or minority applicants than among their
peers.116 Our high-list/high-discount system thus may discourage low-income
and minority students from even considering law school.117
Third, the discounting system imposes particularly high psychic costs
on low-income and minority applicants. Many of these applicants distrust
bureaucratic decision-making.118 They may also fear that their race or low
113.

See infra Part II.C.

114. See SARA GOLDRICK-RAB, PAYING THE PRICE: COLLEGE COSTS, FINANCIAL AID,
BETRAYAL OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 252 (2016).
115.

AND THE

See Davis, supra note 107, at 6-15; Griﬃth, supra note 66, at 1023.

116. See JENNIFER GIANCOLA & RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, TRUE MERIT: ENSURING OUR BRIGHTEST
STUDENTS HAVE ACCESS TO OUR BEST COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 14-25 (2016), https://www.
luminafoundation.org/ﬁles/resources/jkcf-true-merit-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/48KXDAQA]; WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 13; Donald E. Heller, Student Price Response in Higher
Education, 68 J. HIGHER EDUC. 624, 632, 647 (1997); Lesley J. Turner, Rethinking Institutional
Aid: Implications for Aﬀordability, Access, and the Eﬀectiveness of Federal Student Aid, in REINVENTING
FINANCIAL AID: CHARTING A NEW COURSE TO COLLEGE AFFORDABILITY 149, 150 (Andrew P.
Kelly & Sara Goldrick-Rab eds., 2014).
117.

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE GAO-10-20, HIGHER EDUCATION: ISSUES RELATED
TO LAW SCHOOL COST AND ACCESS 37 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/297206.pdf
(noting that some law school oﬃcials believed that “rising law school tuition may have
disproportionately aﬀected minority students”). Some law schools attempt to enhance
diversity by oﬀering special scholarships to minority students; others try to increase access
by considering need as part of their scholarship process. Unless schools advertise these
practices widely, however, they will not overcome the disparate impact of sticker shock.
See also infra notes 189-90 and accompanying text (describing the opacity of scholarship
information currently provided by most law schools).

118. Sara Goldrick-Rab & Tammy Kolbe, A Matter of Trust: Applying Insights from Social Psychology to
Make College Aﬀordable, 3 POL’Y INSIGHTS FROM BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 237, 241 (2016).
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economic status will disadvantage them when negotiating for scholarships.119
Law schools ask these students to commit to legal education, invest signiﬁcant
time and money in studying for the LSAT, risk rejection from multiple schools,
and then undertake an uncertain negotiation process—all before they will
know the cost of their legal education. This is a heavy burden to place on any
young adult, but it is particularly weighty for students with limited experience
in higher education.120
Some of the same concerns may limit applications from another group
that remains underrepresented in the legal profession: women.121 A large body
of research demonstrates that women are less comfortable than men when
negotiating for their own ﬁnancial advantage.122 By requiring prospective
students to engage in high-stakes ﬁnancial negotiations before they attend
their ﬁrst class, law schools may deter women from applying to their programs.
Only 2.6% of female college graduates apply to law school, while 3.4% of male
graduates do so.123
119. For studies demonstrating racial diﬀerences in negotiation outcomes, see Ian Ayres, Further
Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109
(1995); Paul J. Ferraro & Ronald G. Cummings, Cultural Diversity, Discrimination, and Economic
Outcomes: An Experimental Analysis, 45 ECON. INQUIRY 217 (2007); Jennifer T. Kubota et al., The
Price of Racial Bias: Intergroup Negotiations in the Ultimatum Game, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 2498 (2013). For
the impact of socioeconomic class, see Michael W. Kraus & Wendy Berry Mendes, Sartorial
Symbols of Social Class Elicit Class-Consistent Behavioral and Physiological Responses: A Dyadic Approach,
143 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 2330 (2014).
120. See Randolph, supra note 100, at 67 (describing the burdens on students who “do not know
the price that they will pay to attend a given college before they apply to schools”); GoldrickRab & Kolbe, supra note 118 (describing the many psychic burdens that low-income and
minority students bear as they pursue higher education).
Applicants have tried to mitigate the uncertainty of law school pricing by developing
websites like lawschoolnumbers.com and top-law-schools.com. Both sites encourage
applicants to post information about their academic credentials, admission status at speciﬁc
schools, and scholarship awards from those schools. Other applicants can draw upon this
information when evaluating scholarship oﬀers and negotiating for a higher oﬀer. The
sites may assist some applicants, but they are probably unknown to others. For some, the
information on these sites may actually increase the stress of the application and negotiation
process. See also supra note 99 (describing how law schools may tap information contained in
these sites).
121. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, A CURRENT GLANCE AT WOMEN
IN THE LAW (2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/marketing/women/
current_glance_statistics_january2017.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/QLG5TBW8] (detailing persistent underrepresentation of women at diﬀerent levels of the
profession).
122. See, e.g., LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T ASK: THE HIGH COST OF
AVOIDING NEGOTIATION—AND POSITIVE STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE (2007); Emma Holliday
et al., Gender Diﬀerences in Resources and Negotiation Among Highly Motivated Physician-Scientists, 30 J.
GEN. INTERNAL MED. 401 (2015).
123. Deborah Jones Merritt & Kyle McEntee, The Leaky Pipeline for Women Entering
the Legal Profession 1 (Nov. 2016), https://www.lstradio.com/women/documents/
MerrittAndMcEnteeResearchSummary_Nov-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/84B5-UNAF].
This statistic surprises many legal educators; they forget that women make up 57.1% of
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The primary factor that law schools use to award “merit” scholarships,
ﬁnally, correlates highly with race, gender, and socioeconomic background.
Black and Latino/a law students have lower LSAT scores than their white
and Asian classmates.124 Women suﬀer the same disadvantage compared with
men.125 Students whose parents never attended college, similarly, average
lower LSAT scores than students with more educated parents.126 Scholarships
that stress LSAT scores, therefore, reduce access for all these historically
disadvantaged groups.
Whatever the mechanism, merit-based scholarships do seem to depress
access and diversity within legal education. One study shows that the
percentage of black and Mexican-American law students declined between
1993 and 2008, a period in which schools increasingly embraced merit aid.127
Another conﬁrms that that black, Latino/a, and moderate-income law students
are less likely than their white, Asian, and aﬄuent classmates to receive merit
scholarships.128 And, although no study directly ties gender to scholarships,
recent work shows that women law students cluster in signiﬁcantly lowerranked schools than men.129 That enrollment pattern may stem from schools
oﬀering fewer merit scholarships to women.130
On the college level, a well-designed study oﬀers further evidence that
merit-based aid diminishes access for minorities and low-income students.
Economist Amanda Griﬃth compared colleges that shifted to merit aid with
those that did not, while controlling for numerous diﬀerences between those
college graduates. Id. If law school were as attractive to women as to men, applications
would rise sixteen percent overall. Id. Note that women outnumber men in many other
graduate programs; their reluctance to apply to law school does not reﬂect a lack of interest
in graduate education. Id.
124. See LSSSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 9.
125. LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, TECHNICAL REPORT 14-02, SUSAN P. DALESSANDRO ET
AL., LSAT PERFORMANCE WITH REGIONAL, GENDER, AND RACIAL/ETHNIC BREAKDOWNS:
2007–2008 THROUGH 2013-2014 TESTING YEARS 19–20 (2014), https://www.lsac.org/docs/
default-source/research-(lsac-resources)/tr-14-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AA6-RS8R].
126. LSSSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 10. Researchers frequently use parental education as a
measure of family income. Id.
127. Conrad Johnson, Disturbing Trend in Law School Diversity, COLUM. L. SCH, http://blogs.law.
columbia.edu/salt/#content (last visited June 22, 2017). In more recent years, as overall
class sizes have fallen, the percentage of black and Latino/a law students has risen again.
See Aaron N. Taylor, Diversity as a Law School Survival Strategy, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 321, 340, 342
(2015). The absolute number of those minority students, however, has declined and their
enrollment has shifted to less prestigious schools. Id. at 340–43.
128. LSSSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 9–10. In this study, two-thirds of white (sixty-seven percent)
and aﬄuent (sixty-ﬁve percent) students reported receiving merit scholarships; just half of
black (forty-nine percent) and economically disadvantaged (ﬁfty-two percent) students did
so.
129. Merritt & McEntee, supra note 123, at 2.
130. Id. at 3.
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groups.131 Her regression analysis persuasively shows that adoption of merit
aid was “associated with a decrease in the percentage of low-income and Black
students, particularly at the more selective institutions.”132
Conversely, another recent study shows that mandating need-based aid
increases enrollment by low-income and minority students.133 The colleges
in the latter study diﬀerentiated tuition by degree program but also devoted
legislatively required amounts of revenue to need-based aid. The combined
eﬀect shifted low-income and minority students into degree programs with
more promising career outcomes.
Law schools, in sum, have a strong argument that restrictions on meritbased aid would increase both the number of students applying to law school
and the diversity of those applicants. As the Third Circuit recognized in Brown
II, those are important procompetitive eﬀects. Enhancing consumer choice
is a traditional procompetitive eﬀect recognized by the antitrust laws.134 By
restricting merit-based scholarships, law schools would attract more lowincome, minority, and female applicants—and would increase the number of
students beneﬁting from legal education.135 More diverse classes, meanwhile,
would improve the quality of the educational product.136 Courts have also
recognized that eﬀect as procompetitive under rule-of-reason analysis.137
These procompetitive eﬀects carry special weight in legal education because
law schools serve as gatekeepers to the legal profession. If law schools increase
the number and diversity of their students, as well as the quality of their
educational program, the profession will beneﬁt. Those competitive beneﬁts,
in turn, will ﬂow to consumers of legal services.
131.

Griﬃth, supra note 66. Griﬃth’s study included 133 private colleges that did not oﬀer merit
aid in 1987. Over the next nineteen years, ninety-three of those schools started awarding
merit aid; Griﬃth compared outcomes at those schools with those at the other forty.

132. Griﬃth, supra note 66, at 1033. See also Eric A. Hanushek et al., Borrowing Constraints, College
Aid, and Intergenerational Mobility, 8 J. HUM. CAP. 1, 1 (2014) (in a theoretical model, need-based
aid was more eﬀective than merit-based aid in “promoting aggregate eﬃciency and income
equality”); Sigal Alon, Who Beneﬁts Most from Financial Aid? The Heterogeneous Eﬀect of Need-Based
Grants on Students’ College Persistence, 92 SOC. SCI. Q. 807 (2011) (demonstrating the importance
of need-based aid in helping low-income students persist in college).
133. Rodney Andrews & Kevin Stange, Price Regulation, Price Discrimination, and Equality of Opportunity
in Higher Education: Evidence from Texas (Univ of Mich., Working Paper, Feb. 2017), http://
www-personal.umich.edu/~kstange/papers/AndrewsStange2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
PPC9-D3NG]).
134. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984);
Brown II, 5 F.3d at 658, 675.
135. Most schools currently operate under capacity, see supra note 110, so they could admit
qualiﬁed low-income, minority, and female applicants without displacing other students.
136. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 319–20, 330–32 (2003) (citing numerous sources).
137.

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 114–15; Brown II, 5 F.3d at 674.

Agreements to Improve Student Aid: An Antitrust Perspective

39

C. Impaired Development of Human Capital
Law schools, like other educational programs, enhance human capital: A
law degree increases both job opportunities and income for degree holders.138
That capital development, however, is not uniform across law schools. Some
schools are better investments than others.139
When prospective students choose among schools, therefore, they make
an important choice about developing their human capital. Scholars have
shown that wealthy students tend to choose institutions that will maximize
their human capital, even if they pay more to attend those schools.140 Lowand middle-income students are more price-sensitive; they are more likely to
compromise their capital development for lower tuition—even when long-term
returns would justify a greater investment.141
Merit-based scholarships exacerbate this trend. Wealthy students enroll at
the school that oﬀers them the highest promise of capital development, even if
they pay full tuition for that opportunity.142 These students can aﬀord to reject
scholarship oﬀers from schools with lower prospects of capital development.
Low- and moderate-income students, on the other hand, must balance
capital development against cost. These students may decline full-price seats
at schools that will maximize their capital development while accepting
scholarships at schools that oﬀer somewhat less promise. The latter students
138. Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree, 43 J. LEGAL STUDIES
249 (2014).
139. JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 49–50,
57–60 (2005); Luis Garicano & Thomas N. Hubbard, Hierarchical Sorting and Learning Costs:
Theory and Evidence from the Law, 58 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 349 (2005); Organ, supra
note 102; Richard Sander & Jane Bambauer, The Secret of My Success: How Status, Eliteness, and
School Performance Shape Legal Careers, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 893, 917 (2012) (status of
law school correlates signiﬁcantly with income even after controlling for LSAT scores and
law school grades); Scott F. Norberg, The Case for an ABA Accreditation Standard on Employment
Outcomes 10 (FIU Legal Studs. Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 17-20, 2017), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2998306 (showing wide range of initial employment outcomes among law schools).
140. Christopher Avery & Caroline M. Hoxby, Do and Should Financial Aid Packages Aﬀect Students’
College Choices? in COLLEGE CHOICES: THE ECONOMICS OF WHERE TO GO, WHEN TO GO, AND
HOW TO PAY FOR IT 239, 265–68 (Caroline M. Hoxby ed., 2004).
141. See ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE & MARTIN VAN DER WERF, THE 20% SOLUTION: SELECTIVE
COLLEGES CAN AFFORD TO ADMIT MORE PELL GRANT RECIPIENTS 6–7 (low-income students
are underrepresented at selective colleges that “produce graduates that earn more in the
workplace on average”), https://cew-7632.kxcdn.com/wp-content/uploads/The-20-PercentSolution-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WT4-PTMX]; ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE & JEFF STROHL,
SEPARATE & UNEQUAL: HOW HIGHER EDUCATION REINFORCES THE INTERGENERATIONAL
REPRODUCTION OF WHITE RACIAL PRIVILEGE (2013) (documenting increased segregation of
black, Latino/a, and low-income students in less selective, low-tuition colleges), https://
cew-7632.kxcdn.com/wp-content/uploads/SeparateUnequal.FR_.pdf [https://perma.cc/
PPX8-9CY5]; Turner, supra note 116, at 161–62.
142. See Epple et al., supra note 103, at 1–2 (under merit-based schemes, students who pay
maximum tuition at each school “are of relatively low ability in the school” and “have
income suﬃciently high so that they are willing to pay the price maximum”).

40

Journal of Legal Education

beneﬁt from a low-cost legal education, but they constrain the long-term value
of their degree.143
Merit-based aid thus fosters a system that sorts students by wealth, rather
than by the merit it purports to reward.144 High-income students tend to
“matriculate up,” paying full price to attend the school that is most attractive
to them. Moderate-income students are more likely to “matriculate down,”
accepting scholarships to attend less-preferred schools—even when they have
better credentials than their wealthy peers.145
143. Choosing a lower-ranked school does not inevitably depress a student’s long-term
prospects. A student who attends a lower-ranked school, for example, may compensate for
that constraint by performing exceptionally well. See Sander & Bambauer, supra note 139, at
901 (ﬁnding that student grades play a greater role than prestige in predicting the ﬁnancial
returns to legal education). The strategy, however, is risky; some career opportunities decline
precipitously outside the most elite law schools. The academic consensus, along with the
behavior of wealthy students, counsels that “where you go to school matters.” GIANCOLA &
KAHLENBERG, supra note 116, at 8.
144. See GIANCOLA & KAHLENBERG supra note 116, at 1 (“American postsecondary education is
highly stratiﬁed by socioeconomic class, with 72 percent of students in the nation’s most
competitive institutions coming from families in the wealthiest quartile.”); Richard Sander,
The Use of Socioeconomic Aﬃrmative Action at the University of California, in THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION: NEW PATHS TO HIGHER EDUCATION DIVERSITY AFTER FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 99,
105 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2014) (“Nationally, elite law schools . . . draw only about
one-tenth of their students from the bottom half of the national SES distribution”); Aaron
N. Taylor, Director’s Message, LSSSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 6 (“These trends [in law school
merit aid] exacerbate preexisting privilege and disadvantage, setting the stage for long-term
disparities in experiences and outcomes.”).
145. To understand this dynamic, consider two hypothetical students: Veronica is wealthy, while
Betty is poor. Betty’s college grades and LSAT scores win her admission to Pembrooke
School of Law, a ﬁctitious school ranked about tenth in U.S. News. Betty’s credentials put her
slightly above the median for Pembrooke, and that school oﬀers her a scholarship covering
one-quarter of her tuition. Riverdale Law, another ﬁctitious school ranked about thirtieth,
also admits Betty. Her LSAT score and UGPA put her more signiﬁcantly above the median
at Riverdale, so the school oﬀers her a half-tuition scholarship.
Betty would like to attend Pembrooke because it has a higher ranking, it oﬀers a clinical
program that appeals to her, and she particularly likes the professors she met during a
campus visit. She concludes, however, that the price diﬀerential is too high; without a safety
net of family support she is reluctant to borrow too heavily. She accepts the half-tuition
scholarship from Riverdale.
Veronica’s grades and scores are lower than Betty’s. When Betty gives up her seat at
Pembrooke, Veronica is admitted oﬀ the waitlist with no scholarship money. Several other
schools, including Riverdale, oﬀer Veronica small scholarships but she chooses to attend
Pembrooke at full price; her parents’ wealth supports that option.
How would a shift to need-based scholarships change this scenario? If Pembrooke
devoted more of its resources to need-based scholarships, it might oﬀer Betty a more
substantial scholarship—allowing her to attend her preferred school. Veronica, then, would
not gain admission to Pembrooke; she would attend Riverdale or another school that
admitted her.
The example demonstrates the paradox of “merit-based” aid. Under a merit-based
system, the student with lower credentials (Veronica) attends the higher-ranked school.
A shift to need-based aid allows the more qualiﬁed student (Betty) to attend that higherranked school if she wants to do so.
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Shifting aid to need-based scholarships alters this dynamic. Dennis Epple
and his colleagues found that awarding college aid purely on the basis of need
“causes some of the [ﬁnancially] poorer students to attend higher quality
colleges” while “the reverse is true for some of the richer students.”146 A policy
limiting merit-based aid thus “increases the access to high quality education
of lower income households.”147 It can also raise the quality of students at each
school because low-income students can aﬀord to attend the most selective
school that admits them.148
Enhancing the development of human capital improves consumer welfare
in several ways. Well-educated individuals produce high-quality goods and
services; they also innovate to challenge existing sellers. These highly educated
individuals, ﬁnally, have the resources to consume a wide variety of goods
and services. Our competitive economy prospers when individuals maximize
development of their human capital.149 If law schools encourage low-income
students to make the same educational investments that wealthier students are
able to make, consumers and the economy will beneﬁt. Transferring resources
from merit-based scholarships to need-based ones would help achieve that
end. Wealthy students would still maximize their human capital investment
by attending the institutions that best match their credentials and career goals.
Financially disadvantaged students, meanwhile, would acquire the resources
to make the same choices.150
III. Practical Options for Law Schools and the Council
As explained above, our current system of merit-based aid undermines
competition in at least three ways: It raises overall costs to law students, reduces
access and diversity, and impairs capital development by low-income students.
Those losses provide procompetitive justiﬁcations for agreements limiting
merit-based scholarships. The justiﬁcations are especially compelling in the
market for legal education because that market directly aﬀects the one for legal
services. If law schools can moderate costs, enhance access and diversity, and
promote capital development, they will also improve competition in the legal
profession.
146. Epple et al., supra note 107, at 916.
147. Id. at 888.
148. For an example of this eﬀect, see the story of Betty and Veronica supra note 145.
149. See Goldin, supra note 10 (describing the importance of human capital development in the
United States). Developing human capital is especially important in a global economy.
Today’s law school graduates compete, not only with other graduates of U.S. schools, but
with lawyers from around the world.
150. Some defenders of merit-based aid argue that these scholarships enable lower-ranked schools
to enhance their educational quality by enrolling a few “superstars” who would otherwise
attend a higher-ranked school. Low- and moderate-income superstars, however, are most
likely to take advantage of those scholarships; wealthier superstars will choose to attend the
higher-ranked school. Given the disadvantages that low-income students suﬀer throughout
their lives, it seems unfair to rely upon them to enhance the education of wealthier (but less
accomplished) classmates.

42

Journal of Legal Education

These procompetitive eﬀects oﬀer strong policy reasons for law schools to
limit merit-based aid; they would also provide a defense against any antitrust
challenge. Under Brown II,151 O’Bannon,152 and other precedents, courts almost
certainly would judge agreements to restrict merit aid under the rule of reason.
A court might ﬁnd an agreement anti-competitive under the ﬁrst step of that
analysis, but law schools could advance procompetitive justiﬁcations at least
as strong as those presented in Brown II and O’Bannon.153 More narrowly tailored
alternatives would be diﬃcult to identify; indeed, an agreement that merely
limited merit aid (rather than banning it entirely) would be more narrowly
tailored than the current congressional exemption.154 Rule-of-reason analysis
thus would favor law schools.155
We recognize, however, that lawsuits are expensive and time-consuming to
defend. Law schools might not want to risk those costs—although MIT won
widespread admiration for doing so in the 1990s.156 We present here, therefore,
three practical options for law schools. Each of these avenues would permit
151.

See supra notes 37–55 and accompanying text (discussing Brown II).

152. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
153. The procompetitive rationales advanced in Brown were very similar to those oﬀered here. Law
schools, however, are in a stronger position than the Brown defendants for two reasons: (1)
A much broader theoretical and empirical literature supports their procompetitive claims;
and (2) any agreement among law schools would not include the very dubious Ivy Overlap
practice of agreeing on aid amounts for individual applicants.
In O’Bannon, similarly, the defendant oﬀered weak empirical evidence of a procompetitive
eﬀect. See Ross & DeSarbo, supra note 88. Law schools can rely upon a well-developed
literature to defend the procompetitive eﬀects discussed here.
154. See supra Part II.C.
155. Judicial opinions suggest that “plaintiﬀs almost never win under the rule of reason.” Michael
A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV.
827, 830 (2009). The most recent study of published opinions, in fact, found that plaintiﬀs
won only one of 222 cases assessed under the rule of reason. Id. Disputes generating a
published opinion may not represent the full universe of antitrust claims; defendants with
weak cases may be more likely to settle before the dispute generates a judicial opinion.
Still, the published case law suggests that current antitrust law favors defendants in many
circumstances.
Law schools faced with an antitrust claim might obtain summary dismissal of any
private lawsuits, without reaching the rule-of-reason analysis, on the ground that no private
plaintiﬀ can establish a suﬃcient antitrust injury. A law student with a high LSAT score and
little ﬁnancial need might claim that an agreement restricting merit aid reduced the value of
scholarships oﬀered to him. It would be diﬃcult, however, for that student to establish the
value of any scholarship he would have received absent the agreement; current practices are
highly discretionary and subject to individual negotiation. In addition, the challenger and
other students would have beneﬁted from an oﬀsetting moderation of list prices.
Questions of antitrust standing and injury, however, are complex; a disgruntled student
or other private party might suggest suﬃcient antitrust injury to proceed with a lawsuit. For
that reason, we focus our discussion on outcomes under a full rule-of-reason analysis.
156. See WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 197 (“MIT’s stance was much admired by elite-college
administrators, including many at Ivy colleges, and other people concerned about student
aid. One of the smaller overlap colleges sent ten thousand dollars to MIT as a gesture of
appreciation.”).
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schools to limit merit-based aid with little or no antitrust risk. In the ﬁnal
subsection, we explain that most of the same options would support adoption
of an accreditation standard limiting merit-based aid.
A. Use the Statutory Safe Harbor
Congress already allows institutions of higher education to make agreements
awarding scholarships only to ﬁnancially needy students; those covenants are
exempt from the antitrust laws.157 Schools qualify for this exemption as long as
they admit all students on a “need-blind basis.”158 Admissions, in other words,
must occur “without regard to the ﬁnancial circumstances of the student
involved or the student’s family.”159
We suspect that most, if not all, law schools admit students on a need-blind
basis.160 The exemption, therefore, is available for any schools choosing to use
it. The only drawback to this safe harbor is that it requires schools to award
all their ﬁnancial aid on the basis of need.161 Many law schools might prefer to
limit merit aid rather than ban it entirely. In particular, schools might want to
retain scholarships focused on attracting minority students, those committed
to public service, or those who have demonstrated exceptional leadership.
Some endowed scholarships might also specify merit- rather than need-based
criteria.
It is, however, at least worth considering this option. Preservation of meritbased scholarships may not be as important as legal educators ﬁrst imagine.
Schools could reward students committed to public service through backend loan repayment assistance programs rather than upfront scholarships.162
Minority students often qualify for need-based aid, especially when schools
consider family wealth rather than income.163 Schools, ﬁnally, may have
adopted scholarships focused on leadership and other qualities partly to
157.

15 U.S.C. § 1 note (2012). See generally supra Part II.C.

158. 15 U.S.C. § 1 note (2012).
159. Id.
160. For graduate programs, generous federal loans relieve much of the incentive to consider
an applicant’s ability to pay. Law schools know that if an applicant cannot ﬁnance her
education directly, she has the option of covering costs through federal loans.
161. See Collins & Cottafavi Memo, supra note 16, at 30.
162. Cf. Whitford, supra note 4, at 11 (favoring the use of more “back-ended needs-based ﬁnancial
aid”).
163. See LSSSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 10 (“Black [law students] were the most likely recipients
of need-based scholarship aid; white [students] were least likely.”). Harvard Law School,
which awards all of its scholarships based on need, makes clear that it assesses several
measures of a family’s wealth: “A resource assessment is a relative measure of a given family’s
ﬁnancial strength compared to all other families applying for ﬁnancial aid in an academic
year, and is best thought of as a measurement of each family’s ability to ﬁnance the cost of
education over time. It is an evaluation of not just a family’s current resources from present
income earned, but also of the overall savings and investment level, as well as the family’s
ability to borrow against these resources.” Determination of Financial Need, supra note 12.
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balance awards tied to test scores and grades. If schools eliminate the latter
scholarships, are other types of merit-based aid necessary?
Need-based aid is so eﬀective at lowering costs, increasing access, enhancing
diversity, and developing human capital that law schools should at least
explore agreements to abandon all merit-based aid. Those agreements would
risk no antitrust liability. Note that the statutory exemption does not require
all schools to participate in an agreement. A subset of schools could lead the
way by agreeing to award ﬁnancial aid solely on the basis of need.164 Shifting
scholarship practices as part of a group carries less rankings risk than acting
unilaterally. Indeed, if schools publicize their shared commitment to lowering
costs and addressing need, they might increase the quantity and quality of
their applicants.165
B. Lobby for Modification of the Statutory Exemption
If the current statutory exemption does not accommodate enough law
schools, schools could ask Congress to modify the exemption. A slight change—
to allow agreements limiting merit-based aid—would serve the procompetitive
interests outlined above. None of those interests requires complete abolition
of merit aid; even limiting that aid could reduce costs, increase access, improve
diversity, and enhance the development of human capital. Law schools,
therefore, could make a persuasive policy case to modify the exemption.
In addition to those arguments, three factors might persuade Congress to
grant this relief. First, the current statute simply reﬂects the practices of the
colleges that originally lobbied for the exemption. Those colleges wanted
to ban all merit-based aid, and the statute adopted their goal. There is no
evidence that Congress would have rejected a diﬀerent exemption that allowed
agreements to limit merit aid.
Second, a modiﬁed exemption would be less restrictive than the current
one. The current provision oﬀers just two choices: Agree to ban all merit-based
aid or make no agreements. Agreements to moderate merit aid oﬀer more
market ﬂexibility, better furthering both educational and competitive goals.
Finally, if law schools favor modifying the exemption, they are unlikely to
meet opposition from other quarters.166 The change would impose no costs
164. Shared characteristics might prompt schools to form this type of group. Schools with a
commitment to Christian education, for example, might decide that need-based aid
furthers that commitment. A group of ﬂagship public law schools, similarly, might further
their identity by declaring their commitment to achieving lower costs, greater access, and
increased diversity through need-based scholarships.
165. The current exemption expires on Sept. 30, 2022, but Congress has continually renewed a
form of the exemption since ﬁrst adopting it in 1992. Even if the exemption ends in 2022, it
gives law schools ﬁve years to reform harmful scholarship practices.
166. Like Professor Whitford, we believe that “many law schools” would like to shift resources
from merit-based aid to need-based aid, but that they don’t see a way to accomplish that goal
without collective action. Whitford, supra note 4, at 12. Our article builds on that premise.
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on the federal budget, and it would not compel any action by colleges or
universities. Modifying the exemption would simply allow institutions to
agree to limit merit-based aid if they believed those agreements would promote
access and other higher education goals.
Several college presidents and policymakers have already expressed interest
in lobbying Congress to modify the exemption.167 By working with those
advocates, law schools would strengthen their position while minimizing
their own investment in lobbying. Given the current statutory exemption, the
strong policy reasons to modify that exemption, and the national interest in
expanding ﬁnancial resources for needy students, this advocacy eﬀort holds
promise of success.
C. Request a Letter from the Department of Justice
If law schools cannot ﬁt within the current antitrust exemption, and if
Congress fails to respond to requests for a statutory modiﬁcation, schools have
one other way to minimize antitrust risk while pursuing agreements to limit
merit-based aid. A group of schools could design a suitable agreement and,
before implementing the agreement, request a business review letter from the
Department of Justice.
The department has a well-established procedure for advising businesses
on the potential antitrust consequences of proposed conduct.168 Any business
may submit a written request to the Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust
Division, providing detailed information about the proposed practice. The
division will review the proposed practice, requesting additional data and
conducting an independent investigation if necessary. After completing the
review, the department issues a letter oﬀering one of three possible responses:
1.

The Department of Justice does not presently intend to bring an
enforcement action against the proposed conduct.
2. The Department of Justice declines to state its enforcement intentions.
The Division may or may not ﬁle suit if the proposed conduct happens.
3. The Department of Justice will sue if the proposed conduct happens.169
If schools prefer the current merit-based system, then Congress is unlikely to modify the
exemption. But if educators genuinely want to elevate need-based aid over merit awards,
it should be relatively easy to lobby Congress for a modiﬁcation of the current exemption.
167. See, e.g., WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 191-92; TIME
Collins & Cottafavi Memo, supra note 16, at 30, 32.

TO

REEXAMINE, supra note 16, at 10–11;

168. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTRODUCTION TO ANTITRUST DIVISION BUSINESS REVIEWS (2011),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/atr/legacy/2011/11/03/276833.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/6382-34WW]; Antitrust Division Business Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.6
(2016). The Federal Trade Commission has a similar process, see Advisory Opinions, FED. TRADE
COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/policy/advisory-opinions (last visited June 29, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/8PSY-FRCZ]. We focus on the Department of Justice process because that
agency prosecuted the Ivy Overlap case.
169. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra note 168, at 2.
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A positive response from the department (i.e., a “no present intention”
letter) does not insulate the business from all antitrust liability. The Antitrust
Division “remains free to bring whatever action it subsequently comes
to believe is required by the public interest.”170 After issuing a “no present
intention” letter, however, the division “has never subsequently brought a
criminal action” as long as the parties made “full disclosure at the time the
business review request was presented to the Division.”171
The division also publicizes its business review letters;172 the content of those
letters may discourage private plaintiﬀs from challenging the reviewed action.
If litigation occurs, “courts frequently cite [the division’s] review as a factor in
judicial approval of [the] arrangements.”173 Indeed, “there is no reported case
in which an approved agreement was subsequently held to be unlawful.”174 A
positive business review letter, therefore, would give law schools substantial
protection against antitrust liability.175
Antitrust experts warn of some drawbacks to seeking a business review letter.
Division staﬀ may be conservative in issuing positive letters; if an arrangement
is novel, the division may conduct a “prolonged” review culminating in
a noncommittal letter.176 More worrisome, seeking a review letter may alert
the division and private plaintiﬀs to activity that would have otherwise gone
unnoticed.177
These reservations, however, are unlikely to apply to law schools proposing
to regulate merit-based scholarships. Law schools are nationally prominent;
they would not be able to hide an agreement from the Antitrust Division or
other potential plaintiﬀs. The issues surrounding limitation of merit-based aid,
furthermore, were extensively explored in the Brown litigation and enactment
of the congressional exemption. Assessing the procompetitive (or anti170. Id.
171.

Id.

172. See Business Reviews, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (last updated Mar. 25, 2016), https://www.justice.
gov/atr/business-reviews
173. Peter C. Carstensen, Replacing Antitrust Exemptions for Transportation Industries: The Potential for a
“Robust Business Review Clearance,” 89 OR. L. REV. 1059, 1069 (2011).
174. Id. See also Ky P. Ewing, Jr., Thoughts on Seeking Business Reviews of Competitor Collaborations,
ANTITRUST, Summer 2005, at 40, 42 (“to the best of my knowledge, no successful antitrust
challenge has ever been mounted in court by a private plaintiﬀ against activities ‘cleared’ by
[the Antitrust Division]”).
175. A positive letter, unfortunately, cannot insulate schools from the risk that a lawsuit would
be ﬁled. Plaintiﬀs ﬁle many unsuccessful antitrust challenges, see supra note 155, and those
lawsuits must be defended. Some plaintiﬀs, however, would have trouble establishing
standing to challenge an agreement to restrict merit scholarships; others would struggle
to prove their damages. See supra note 155. Those factors, when combined with a positive
business review letter, might dissuade plaintiﬀs and attorneys from ﬁling suit.
176. Ewing, supra note 174, at 42.
177.

Id. at 41.
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competitive) eﬀects of such an agreement should not be unduly challenging
for Antitrust Division attorneys. Law schools could hope for a deﬁnitive letter
rather than a noncommittal one.178
Most important, the procompetitive arguments outlined above make a
persuasive case in favor of agreements limiting merit-based scholarships. Even
with limited empirical evidence, the Third Circuit signaled in Brown II that
similar rationales could justify these agreements under the rule of reason.
Over the past twenty-ﬁve years, economists and other social scientists have
built a substantial body of research supporting that conclusion. That research
could help convince the Antitrust Division that voluntary agreements limiting
merit aid are procompetitive.
D. Adopt an Accreditation Standard
For simplicity, our discussion has focused on the antitrust status of
agreements among individual law schools. The Council of the ABA Section of
Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, however, could also limit meritbased scholarships by adopting an accreditation standard. Such a standard
could bar merit-based aid entirely, limit the extent of that aid, restrict the
sources of that aid, or take other forms.
An accreditation standard could establish a uniform guidepost for all
law schools while leaving signiﬁcant ﬂexibility to each school. A standard
requiring that need-based aid at least equal merit-based aid, for example,
would not require law schools to award particular levels of aid—or any aid at
all. Nor would that type of standard dictate the type of “merit” recognized
by law schools, the particular students receiving aid, or the amounts of those
awards. Law schools would make all of the latter decisions unilaterally.
From an antitrust perspective, an accreditation standard would not beneﬁt
from the current statutory exemption; that exemption protects agreements
among schools, not accreditation standards. The council, however, could
lobby Congress to modify the exemption to allow accreditation standards
limiting merit-based scholarships. That advocacy could incorporate the same
arguments outlined above.179 Similarly, the council could seek a business
review letter focused on the legality of an accreditation standard. Once again,
the policy arguments developed in this article would support a positive letter.
178. A consortium of colleges and universities used the business-review process in 2011 to seek the
Department’s perspective on a “Designated Suppliers Program” governing school-licensed
apparel. Letter from Donald I. Baker, Baker & Miller, PLLC, to Acting Assistant Attorney
Gen. Sharis A. Pozen (Dec. 15, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/atr/
legacy/2014/01/15/302113.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9UK-BVPM]. The proposed program
included regulation of minimum wages and other working conditions for companies
participating in the program, but the Department found countervailing procompetitive
beneﬁts and issued a “no present intention” letter. Letter from Acting Assistant Attorney
Gen. Sharis A. Pozen to Donald I. Baker, Baker & Miller PLLC (Dec. 16, 2011), https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/atr/legacy/2011/12/19/278342.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
PY7C-GT8X].
179. See supra Part II.
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It is possible that Congress and the Department of Justice would view an
accreditation standard even more favorably than an agreement among law
schools. When applying antitrust law, courts have been quite deferential to
accreditation standards.180 That acquiescence is especially appropriate when
(a) the accrediting body includes decision-makers drawn from outside the
regulated group, and (b) any proposed standards are subject to public notice
and comment. These conditions limit the power of competitors to manipulate
accreditation standards in anti-competitive ways.181
The council’s composition and procedures satisfy both of those
requirements,182 which would carry weight in any antitrust challenge. If the
council concluded after both internal deliberation and public notice and
comment that educational and procompetitive goals require channeling more
ﬁnancial resources to need-based scholarships, and that modest limits on merit
aid would further that end, it is diﬃcult to imagine the Department of Justice
or courts second-guessing that decision.183
180. See, e.g., Found. for Interior Design Educ. Research v. Savannah Coll. of Art & Design, 244
F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2001); Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. ABA, 107 F.3d 1026, 1038
(3d Cir.1997); see generally AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, HANDBOOK ON THE
ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF STANDARDS SETTING (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter STANDARDS SETTING];
Clark C. Havighurst & Peter M. Brody, Accrediting and the Sherman Act, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1994, at 199 (1995) (reviewing history and theory of accreditation cases);
Matthew Struhar, How to Dismantle a Virtual Cartel: The Promises and Pitfalls of Higher Education
Reform in California, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 127, 138 (2013) (“courts have not found that the
Sherman Act requires aggressive policing of accreditation”).
181. Cf. STANDARDS SETTING, supra note 180, at 55 (“the DOJ has indicated that it is less inclined to
challenge a proposed standard where a wide array of constituencies was involved in setting
the standard”).
182. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N ,THE LAW SCHOOL
ACCREDITATION PROCESS 3 (2016) (“The Council is comprised of 21 voting members, no
more than 10 of whom may be law school deans or faculty members. Other members of
the Council include judges, practicing attorneys, one law student, and at least three public
members.”),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_
education/2016_accreditation_brochure_ﬁnal.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
M2PC-RZVB]; SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA
STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, 2016–2017, at 125–26
(2016) (outlining internal operating practices for review and revision of standards).
183.

The council, however, would not be able to invoke state-action immunity to shield the type
of standards discussed here. Although several states require bar applicants to graduate from
ABA-accredited law schools, and thus delegate some authority over professional preparation
to the ABA Council, the council is not itself sovereign. To invoke state-action immunity,
therefore, the council would have to satisfy the two-part test recently conﬁrmed in N.C. State
Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015). Both prongs of that test would be diﬃcult
for the council to satisfy. State supreme courts have not “articulated a clear policy” favoring
agreements to limit merit-based aid; nor do they oﬀer “active supervision” when the council
develops accreditation standards. Id. at 1112.
State-action immunity plays a more central role when unaccredited law schools (or their
students) challenge an accreditation standard. Courts have concluded that those plaintiﬀs
cannot blame accreditation standards for the fact that graduates of unaccredited schools are
not allowed to practice law in some states. Those “complaints are more properly directed to
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It is true that the department sued the ABA in 1995, challenging several
accreditation standards as unlawful restraints of trade.184 That action, however,
concentrated on practices that tended to enhance faculty salaries, as well
as on procedural defects in the council’s membership and standard-setting
procedures. “The focus of th[e] case,” the department explained, “was the
capture of the ABA’s law school accreditation process by those who used it
to advance their self-interest . . . .”185 The department acknowledged that it
was “not particularly qualiﬁed” to determine the content of most accreditation
rules.186 Instead, it sought “to reform the process, removing the opportunity
for taint, and then to have the cleansed process establish new rules.”187
The accreditation standards proposed in this article would not ﬁnancially
beneﬁt law schools at students’ expense. On the contrary, one purpose—
and likely eﬀect—of any limit on merit-based aid would be to lower average
tuition paid by students.188 Given that goal, the companion aims of increasing
access and diversity, and the council’s current processes, it is unlikely that the
department would challenge an accreditation standard focused on increasing
resources for need-based aid.
At the very least, the ABA Council could adopt an accreditation standard
requiring law schools to publicize scholarship practices on their websites and
in other admissions materials. The ABA gathers annual information about the
percentage of students receiving scholarships at each school, the percentage
receiving diﬀerent levels of aid, and the quartile value of those scholarships.
Those data appear in the “ABA Standard 509 Information Report,” which
most law schools post on their websites.189 The law school web pages we have
visited, however, give students no clue that information about tuition discounts
is buried in those linked reports. Instead, schools use extraordinarily vague
language to describe their scholarship practices.190
the state supreme courts that have chosen to recognize only ABA-accredited schools” and
those “state regulatory policies are outside the ambit of the Sherman Act.” Zavaletta v. ABA,
721 F. Supp. 96, 98 (E.D. Va. 1989).
184. Complaint, United States v. ABA, No. 1:95CV01211 (June 27, 1995), https://www.justice.
gov/atr/case-document/ﬁle/485696/download [https://perma.cc/8V7Y-SRZL].
185. United States’ Response to Public Comments at 4, United States v. ABA, No. 1:95CV01211
(Oct. 27, 1995) https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/ﬁle/485676/download [https://
perma.cc/PF9P-SLHQ].
186. Id.
187. Id. See also Order and Final Judgment, United States v. ABA, No. 1:95CV01211 (June 25,
1996) (focusing on salary concerns and procedural remedies), https://www.justice.gov/atr/
case-document/ﬁle/485671/download [https://perma.cc/7LC7-BSEW].
188. See supra Part II.A.
189. These reports also appear on the ABA’s website, ABA REQUIRED DISCLOSURES, supra note 1.
190. Our alma mater, for example, includes this language in the ﬁnancial aid portion of its website:
“Columbia Law School awards grant assistance primarily on the basis of demonstrated
ﬁnancial need. However, there are a number of fellowships that are not based on ﬁnancial
need, which are awarded by the Admissions Oﬃce at the time an applicant is admitted
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A “scholarship transparency” standard would require schools to disclose
prominently, in language that applicants will understand: (a) the criteria they
use to award scholarships; (b) the approximate number and size of awards
conferred in diﬀerent categories; and (c) whether the school will negotiate
oﬀers. Students considering law school should be able to estimate the tuition
they will pay before they invest signiﬁcant time and money in the application
process. Potential applicants should also have the information they need
to negotiate eﬀectively. The opacity of our current system hurts too many
applicants—especially those from historically disadvantaged groups.
Law schools might object that they need ﬂexibility in crafting each year’s
scholarship oﬀers, so they could not reliably publicize the number and amount
of grants in advance. This, however, would simply indicate that schools use
discounts to maximize their own revenue and prestige rather than to recognize
genuine merit or address ﬁnancial need. Students—especially low-income,
minority, and female students—would beneﬁt from open information about
the discounts each school might be willing to oﬀer them.
Conclusion
Many legal educators are pessimistic about the chances of reforming
ﬁnancial aid practices. We are somewhat more optimistic: We see several
options for law schools or the council to limit merit-based aid and devote
more resources to need-based scholarships. That shift could moderate the
costs of legal education; increase access for low-income, minority, and female
students; enhance diversity; and encourage sounder investment in human
capital. These beneﬁts would accrue to individual applicants, law schools, the
legal profession, and the economy as a whole. The potential beneﬁts are great,
while the risks are low.
The antitrust laws, as we have shown, do not forbid all agreements or
accreditation standards designed to limit merit-based aid. On the contrary,
law schools and the council have several promising avenues to pursue. The
avenues require some eﬀort, and one of them is not entirely risk-free. The
question is: Will law schools put in the eﬀort? How strong is their commitment
to increasing access and diversity in our profession? If the will exists, the ways
are there.
to the Law School. There is no separate application for these fellowships.” Financial Aid:
An Introduction, COLUM. L. SCH., http://www.law.columbia.edu/ﬁnancial-aid/introduction
(last visited June 30, 2017) [https://perma.cc/AQP6-SNX4]. We could not ﬁnd any further
description of the number, amount, or criteria for the non-need-based fellowships, although
we perused all of the ﬁnancial aid pages and searched the site for “fellowships.”
A few law schools do give students a candid view of their scholarship practices. See, e.g.,
JD Scholarships, T. JEFFERSON SCH. L., https://www.tjsl.edu/admissions/scholarships (last
visited July 9, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7W5M-NCVX ](LSAT and UGPA matrix used to
calculate scholarships); Scholarships and Financial Aid, W. MICH. U. COOLEY SCH. L., http://
cooley.edu/prospective/scholarships.html (last visited July 9, 2017) [https://perma.cc/4V54APAS] (slightly less detailed matrix).

